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Abstract
In his most famous work, Sein und Zeit, M.Heidegger does a brief analysis of language in the frame of the being-in 
as such. In it, he relates this phenomenon with the opening of Dasein, understanding, affective disposition, listening 
and silence. Nevertheless, we consider that to reach a broader understanding of language from Heidegger’s approach; 
we cannot limit ourselves to a Sein und Zeit, rather we must analyze his principal lessons and conferences about the 
topic and relate also to the complete ontological structure of Dasein when asking the question about being. Therefore, 
we propose that language understands, means and expresses the being from the complete ontological structure of 
dasein and when it becomes everydayness, it drags language, which inevitably becomes gossip (gerede). We use the 
phenomenological method, also applying for hermeneutics a synthesis of its main lessons regarding the topic appro-
ximately between 1920 and 1940. The conclusion is that, paradoxically, language understood as listening (Hören), 
poetically determines the return, the resolution (entschlossenheit) and the opening (entschlossenheit) of dasein to the 
question of being in its fullness.
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Resumen
En su obra central Sein und Zeit, Heidegger hace un análisis sucinto del lenguaje dentro del marco del estar-en como 
tal. En él, relaciona tal fenómeno con la aperturidad del dasein, el comprender, la disposición afectiva, la escucha y 
el callar. Sin embargo, consideramos que si queremos alcanzar una comprensión más amplia del lenguaje desde la 
forma como lo abordó Heidegger, no podemos limitarnos a Sein und Zeit , sino que debemos analizar sus principales 
lecciones y conferencias en torno al asunto y en relación, además, con la estructura ontológica completa del dasein de 
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cara a la pregunta por el ser. Proponemos por ello, que el lenguaje comprende, significa y expresa el ser a partir de la 
estructura ontológica completa del dasein, y que cuando esta cae en la cotidianidad, arrastra al lenguaje, que degenera 
inevitablemente como habladuría (gerede). Utilizamos el método fenomenólogico, pero aplicamos, además, para la 
hermenéutica, una síntesis de sus principales lecciones relacionadas con el tema entre 1920 y 1940 aproximadamen-
te. La conclusión es que, paradójicamente, el lenguaje entendido como escucha (hõren) determina poiéticamente el 
regreso, la resolución (entschlossenheit) y apertura (erschlossenheit) del dasein a la pregunta por el ser en su plenitud.
Palabras clave: lenguaje, escucha, comprensión, dasein, fundamento.
Previous Explanations
These reflections about language take part in a broader 
research titled The Liberation of the Question of Being, 
which is based on a synthetic interpretation of some of 
Martin Heidegger’s lessons and conferences confronted in 
his most important work Being and Time. In particular his 
lecture in the winter of 1929 titled Einleitung in die Phi-
losophie; the lessons from the winters of 1935/36 Die Frage 
Nach dem Ding. Zu Kants Lehre von den transzendentalen 
Grundsätzen; and his speech Hölderlin und das Wesen der 
Dichtung, given in Rome on April 1936, included in a 
bigger work in 1944 of the reflections of Heidegger about 
the great German poet titled Erläuterung zu Hölderlins 
Dichtung. Parting from a broader hermeneutic of the 
texts, the primary purpose of this research is to understand 
the human being cofounded ontologically through four 
fundamental metaphysical features: world disclosure, 
historicity, truth, and language. They allow the entity, 
which is the human as a human being, and differentiate it 
from a whole other entity. These four fundamentals, which 
conform the originally the ontological structure of Dasein, 
are found in two modes: firstly, in everyday degradation 
(Entartüng), determined by the fall of Dasein (Verfallen): 
here world disclosure is assumed from the world received, 
historicity falls into the irresponsibility of acting accord-
ing to others, and from a present full of transience and 
immediacy, truth becomes prejudice and supposal, and 
language is degraded as the “instrument” whose main 
function is to “inform” and “voice”. However, in the reso-
lution of Dasein (Erschlossenheit), in which it completely 
assumes its temporal condition of being-toward-death 
and its original comprehension of being as care (Sorge) 
they assume their mode of being full. In this case, we only 
present the language and how this, from its degrading 
phase, returns once again to its metaphysical fundamental 
in the liberation of the question of being. We invite you 
to always keep in mind these previous explanations as a 
constant frame for these reflections. We clarify that our 
research thoroughly follows the inquiries about language 
in Heidegger by Jan Aler. Unlike many, he always tried 
to have in his analysis, the complete coherent flexible and 
moving structure of Dasein, the complete methodologi-
cal horizon of M. Heidegger and the poetic sensibility to 
understand and interpret the track of literature and art, 
which would fall into what Heidegger himself called an 
ontic interpretation:
Heidegger’s explanation describes the structural unity in 
which the ontological determinations are to be understood, 
beginning with a nucleus which is always carefully adhered 
to. Again in a circular movement, such a description passes 
through the moments of the structures almost with despe-
rate tenacity, guarding against its splintering (Cockelmans, 
1972:49).
It was also beneficial to consult a lecturer of Univer-
sidad Nacional de General Sarmiento in Universidad 
Católica Argentina and Universidad de Belgrano, Dr. 
Juan Blanco Ilari’s research paper titled Blanco Ilari, Juan 
(2015) Horizons of Meaning and ontic metamorphosis on the 
fate of a broken dialogue; as well as Edward Javier Ordóñez’s 
paper titled Traits of Fundamental Ontology, which were 
useful to widen and confirm our approach. We would 
also like to add that despite following Heidegger’s work 
rigorously, these reflections have not been realized with an 
orthodox and rigid attitude of his thought, rather “from” 
the thought itself. Understating “from” to be the freedom 
and the space which opens and allows a dia-logue (dia-
logoV) with the great German philosopher. 
The current need of a metaphysical 
substantiation of language4
Our Being in the world is manifested through langua-
ge. It is not that in certain moments we communicate 
and in others, we do not. The human being cannot not 
communicate. In fact, in our most obstinate closing to 
the world, we are already communicating. We say and 
always refer to the Same (Heidegger, 1999:98-131), which 
is why everyday comprehension of this phenomenon as 
an emission, reception, and message decoding technique, 
results in an insufficient extreme. Human beings can 
separate or not from the techniques from time to time 
in their daily routine, but not from language. Their way 
of being factual-historical in the world is and always has 
been, an attitude towards this communicative dimension, 
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be it in their sleep, work, or solace. Why? Could it be 
because when we ask ourselves more about this linguistic 
phenomenon, we might find other more essential pheno-
mena? Certainly, the modern man in his everyday life can 
change –and has changed- language into a dominating 
and controlling, managing and safety technique. Not 
only changing this but also the whole field of reality in 
which it is found (Heidegger, 2006: 45-46). But does 
this important language phenomenon let itself be closed 
in this degradation?
A speaker sending a message supposes that an entity 
has a previous comprehension and interpretation, making 
it legible in what wants to be said to the listener. But it 
is precisely this previous comprehension, (Verständnis), 
pre-ontological, in which the being is manifested, that is 
constantly overlooked in the continuous interpretation of 
all mundane entities. To this, Jan Aler expresses:
Interpretative explanation develops these possibilities pro-
jected by man’s understanding; it unfolds this meaning. 
Explanation grasps the meanings that understanding has 
established. This totally of references, this whole that has 
been articulated before all explanation, this multifarious 
unity of meanings, is disclosed primarily by understanding 
(Cockelmans, 1972: 48).
The being has always been the most ignored, to the 
point at which, inclusively we forget the forgetfulness of 
the being (Heidegger, 2006). The interpretation of the 
message, reduced to decoding, refers only to a conven-
tional and arbitrary reading of it when giving priority to 
the code, it leaves aside, beforehand, the metaphorical 
and poietic interpretations of the entity. On the other 
hand, the reception finally supposes a listening towards 
the being, that goes beyond everyday listening about the 
entity. But not even modern linguistics manage to fully 
and radically clarify, neither the previous comprehension 
of the speaker nor the arbitrary reading of the codes and 
listening (Hören) as an essential requirement of any liste-
ner and any speaker. Could it be, just a coincidence, that 
everyday interpretation of language as a symbol decoding 
technique dominates the field of current public opinion?5 
Does it not come itself from a technical comprehension 
of the world, in other words, what we conceive as reality? 
Certainly, the project of being modern, which we are 
still on, conceives the total of the entity as domination 
and will of power, and science itself as comprehension, 
management and productive application to the law of cau-
sality (Heidegger, 2006:113-115). In every phenomenon, 
according to it, primacy is given to the cause-and-effect 
law. However, all the ontological fundamentals leading to 
it are reduced and abstracted. All pre-supposed (positum) 
of the subject (subiectum) which make science, without 
the ones which it would be impossible to conceive this. 
Inclusively, this resignation of the ontological meditation 
is taken as a methodological win (Heidegger, 2006: 75).
 From this consideration, it is not sufficient that 
modern linguistics, through pragmatics (with Apel), 
psychobiology (with Chomsky), semiotics (with Pierce, 
Hjelmslev, and Parret), modern epistemology (Popper), 
and inductive logic (Carnap) multiply their methods; 
nor that it also exempts them. From that lack of compre-
hension and serious treatment of supposed ontological 
sayings, as much as you want to pretend to ignore, are still 
basing themselves on ontological foundations, however, 
from an ontic interpretation leaving aside the meditation 
of being (Heidegger, 2006: 114). In fact, the line traced 
by Heidegger from German linguistics at the end of the 
eighteenth century (Herder, Humboldt), defers the mo-
dern epistemological line which conceives language as an 
instrument, and whose principal guidelines date back to 
philosophers such as T. Hobbes, Locke, and Condillac. 
Regarding the line of German thought and its difference 
to modern epistemology highly influenced by empiricism, 
Charles Taylor says: 
I want to call this line of thinking “expressive-constitutive.” 
It arises in the late eighteenth century in reaction to the main 
doctrine about language which develops within the confines 
of modern epistemology. The philosophy articulated in diffe-
rent ways by Hobbes, Locke, and Condillac. On this view, 
language is conceived as an instrument. The constitutive 
theory reacts against this, and Heidegger’s image of language 
speaking can be seen as a development out of this original 
reaction (Dreyfus & Wrathall, 2005: 433).
Moreover, that we appeal to cultural anthropology 
(Levi-Strauss), to ethnology (Farrar), to mathematical 
and atomism logic (Russel, first Wittgenstein), or to 
psychology (Jung) understanding language itself, be it a 
communicative faculty or a mere phonetic-physiologic 
conduct, it is not sufficient to place ourselves in the 
necessary ontological horizon. Whoever perceives an 
explanation founded and originated in the phenomena 
of the manifestation (truth), comprehension of being 
(transcend), presentation (temporality) and interpretation 
(world disclosure) resulting in deductive and ontological 
conditions of language, understood as the manifestation 
of the being of the entity itself (aπofansiV) (Heidegger, 
1993: 178). They also do not explain the thesis posed at 
the beginning: human beings cannot “not” be language. 
Surely these foundations of language do not refer to 
phonetic capacities or coded cultural interpretations of 
the world, rather they transcend the factual experience 
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and, additionally, make it possible from the ontological 
structure of the human being projected with the world 
and, from this, all decisive comprehension attempts of 
language understood as speech must start (Rede):
Die Versuche, das ‹‹Wesen der Sprache‹‹ zu fassen, haben 
denn immer auch die Orientierung an einem einzelnen 
dieser Momente genommen und die Sprache begriffen am 
Leitfaden der Idee des ‹‹ Ausdrucks ‹‹ , ‹‹ der symbolischen 
Form ‹‹ , der Mitteilung als ‹‹ Aussage ‹‹ , der ‹‹ Kundgabe 
‹‹ von Erlebnissen oder der ‹‹ Gestaltung ‹‹ des Lebens. Für 
eine voll zureichende Deefinition der Sprache wäre aber 
auch nichts gewonnen, wollte man diese verschiedenen 
Bestimmungsstücke synkretistisch zusammenschieben. Das 
Entscheidende bleibt, zuvor das ontologisch-existenziale 
Ganze der Strucktur der Rede auf dem Grunde der Analitik 
des Daseins herauszuarbeiten (Heidegger, 1984: 163).
The first steps to a comprehension originated in lan-
guage in a hermeneutic direction, opposed to the abstrac-
tion of modern linguistic interpretation and supporting 
the ontological shift realized by M. Heidegger made 
by Wilhelm von Humboldt in the nineteenth century, 
supporting himself in the problem of world disclosure. 
Therefore, agreeing with Charles Taylor, it is accurate to 
understand the horizon in which the problematic of lan-
guage in Heidegger is framed, to go back to the linguistic 
“revolutionary” contribution reached in Germany at the 
end of the eighteenth century:
I want to offer a reading of Heidegger’s views on language 
which places him within the context of the revolutionary 
change in the understanding of language and art that oc-
curred in the late eighteenth century in Germany. I believe 
this is the most fruitful context in which to set his writings 
on the topic (Dreyfus & Wrathall, 2005: 433).
Referring to the linguistic perspective proposed by W. 
von Humboldt, H.G. Gadamer expresses in a fundamen-
tal chapter of Truth and Method (Wahrheit und Methode), 
the third part of the work, in which language is treated as 
a horizon of a hermeneutic ontology (Sprache als Horizon 
einer hermeneutischen Ontologie)  and language as a world 
experience (Sprache als Welterfahrung):
Seine eigentlich Bedeutung fur das Problem der Hemeneutik 
liegt woanders: in der Erweisung der Sprachansicht als Wel-
tansich. Er hat den lebindegen Vollzug des Sprechens, die 
sprachliche Energeia als das Wesen der Sprache erkannt und 
dadurch den Dogmatismus der Grammatiker gebrochen.
(...) Er hat gezeigt wie schief diese Frage ist, sofern sie die 
Konstruction einer sprachlosen Menschenwelt einschließt, 
deren Erhebung zur Sprachlichkeit irgendwand und ir-
gendwo vor sich gegangen sei. Einer solchen Konstruction 
gegenüber betont Humboldt mit Recht, daß die Sprache 
von ihrem Anbeginn an menschlich ist. Diese Festellung 
verändert nicht nur der Sinn der Frage nach dem Ursprung 
der Sprache- Sie ist die Basis einer weitreichenden anthro-
pologischen Einsicht (Gadamer, 1990: 446).
Immediately and against a methodological reductio-
nism, Gadamer himself clearly highlights the intrinsic 
relation of language with world disclosure and hence, 
with ontology:
Die Sprache is nicht nur eine der Austtatungen, die dem 
Menschen, der in dem Welt ist, zukommt, sondern auf 
ihr beruht,und in ihr stellt sich dar, daß die Menschen 
überhaupt Welt haben.(...) Wichtiger aber ist, was dieser 
Aussage zugrunde liegt: daß die Sprache ihrerseits gegenüber 
der Welt,die in ihr zu Sprache kommt, kein selbtständiges 
Dasein behauptet.Nicht nur ist die Welt nur Welt, sofern 
zur Sprache kommt, die Sprache hat ihr eigentliches Dasein 
nur darin, daß sich in ihr die Welt darstellt. Die ursprün-
glichen Menschlichkeit der Sprache bedeutet also zugleich 
die ursprünglichen Sprachlichkeit des menschlichen in-der-
Welt-Seins (Gadamer,1990:446).
Language and communication itself cannot seek to 
be explained from the criteria which artificial systems 
are conceived and analyzed, rather, from a linguis-
tic community based on world disclosures as one of 
their principal existential and metaphysical categories 
(Gadamer, 1990: 450).
From his first questionings about factual life (Einlei-
tung in die Phäenomenologie der Religion 1920- On-
tologie.Hermeneutik der Faktizität-1923), throughout 
his course Logik: Die Frage nach der Wahrheit given in 
the summer term of 1934, after resigning his position as 
rectorate; to his conferences and collected writings in Un-
terwegs zu Sprache  in the 1950s, even up to the last days of 
his life, through his concern for the problem of logoV in 
Heraclitus, M. Heidegger has been one of the philosophers 
of the twentieth century who was very concerned about 
substantiating the essence of language from an originated 
ontology6, to a direct dialogue alongside Heraclitus, Par-
menides, Plato and in particular Aristotle, among others. 
Regarding Heidegger’s importance and contributions, in 
his essay Heidegger’s Conception of Language in Being and 
Time, Jan Aler expresses:
Reflections on language occupy an important place in 
twentieth-century philosophy due to the situation in which 
philosophy finds itself today. This applies in particular to 
Heidegger’s work. Not only do Heidegger’s reflections on 
language stand out, but also his use of language is especially 
remarkable. Two aspects of his language must be conside-
red: his mode of expression and the manner he presents 
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his argumentation using linguistic (or also) literary data 
(Cockelmans, 1980).
From the perspective of his enormous work, language 
is in no way a mere instrument, rather, it is conceived as 
what opens access to being in the shared world and, in 
fact, calls it “the house of being.” C. Taylor says, about 
this radical position Heidegger has: “To describe language 
as ‘the house of being,’ for instance, is to give it more than 
instrumental status. Indeed, Heidegger repeatedly inveighs 
those views of language which reduce it to a mere instrument 
of thought or communication. Language is essential to the 
“clearing.” (Dreyfus & Wrathall, 2005: 441-442). Further 
on, regarding the aprioristic condition of the opening of 
language(Erschlossenheit) in Dasein and its common 
points and differences in the psychological tendency of 
language as a reflection and conscious in Herder, Taylor 
says:
Heidegger stands in the Herder tradition. But he transposes 
this mode of thinking in his own characteristic fashion. 
While Herder in inaugurating the constitutive view still 
speaks concerning “reflection,” which sounds like a form 
of consciousness, Heidegger turns the issue around and 
sees language as what opens access to meanings. Language 
discloses (…) the language is seen as the condition of the 
human world being disclosed. The disclosure is not intrap-
sychic, but occurs in the space between humans; indeed, 
it helps to define the space that humans share (Dreyfus & 
Wrathall, 2005: 442).
Heidegger’s work is essential if we want to reach a 
deeper understanding of language from its ontological 
roots. Nevertheless, nature being so complex in its com-
plete works (Gesamtausgabe): lessons, books, conferences, 
seminars, notebooks, epistles, shorthand writings, even 
poems, make an articulated and global research seem 
more than necessary. We want to make a contribution 
for it. Keeping this in mind, we openly pose the central 
questions from the ones about the German philosopher’s 
work: What are the metaphysical fundamentals that 
enable language? What do they consist of? How do you 
access them? And how are they articulated in Dasein 
which is the human being?
Metaphysical fundamentals of language 
and its degradation in everyday life 
To answer these fundamental interrogations we will 
locate ourselves in a primordial methodological position: 
how is language in everyday life, not only understood as 
“the way Dasein simply lives day-by-day” (Heidegger, 
1993:386) but how Heidegger himself claims in the last 
paragraph of chapter IV (Zeitlichkeit und Alltäglichkeit) 
of the second section of Sein und Zeit named precisely 
Der zeitliche Sinn der Alltäglichkeit des Daseins, essentially 
understood as the temporized fall of the temporality of 
Dasein. Mit dem Titel Alltäglichkelt im Grunde nichts an-
deres gemeint ist als die Zeitlichkeit  (Heidegger,1984:372). 
This facilitates the way to access its fundamental onto-
logical characters, and at the same time, with this, we 
can follow the same methodological position Heidegger 
had between 1919-1927. In his paper Features of a Fun-
damental Ontology Edward Javier Ordoñez, referring to 
the methodological advantages to starting the analysis 
with the everyday phenomenon in Heidegger’s analytical 
existence, says: “The resource of everyday life will prevent, to 
some extent, the problematic character of how this entity is 
accessed (Ordóñez, 2015). Let us begin with how language 
is revealed in the everyday Dasein being and how the fallen 
temporality drags it into its degeneration.
Language manifests, presents, names, and participates 
the entity in the world so it can resonate its being. Hence, 
we say that it ex-presses it. Meaning, it releases it for it to 
deploy its fundamental.  This is done from an interpre-
tation (Auslegugn) of a respectional totality or a context 
of symbols which are only possible as such, through 
the basis of a previous comprehension of being. Thus, 
language viewed from this fundamental, comprehends, 
means and expresses the ontological entity and shifts it 
to the ontic level and the factual world. They represent 
their three fundamental moments. This articulation of 
understanding, with interpreting and expressing, which 
constitute the ontological fundamental of language, is 
called by Heidegger speech (Rede) (Heidegger, 1993: 184). 
At the beginning of Western thought, for Greeks, these 
three moments of language were highlighted in a sublime 
way, logoV (comprehension of sense), muqoV (interpret-
relate) and eπoV (say-express). For this reason, it is not 
about language being a subsequent, strange, secondary or 
consequent faculty of Dasein, as understood by modern 
thought (Lyons, 1973: 57), but that language, as far as 
being in the mode of understanding its own possibilities 
of its being-in-the-world, is, said by Heidegger’s own 
expression, co-original (mitürsprunglich) language. In 
effect, language understood, not as an interpretation of 
symbols and codes faculty, but as a comprehensive ope-
ning of the human being at being in the open possibilities 
for transcendence, allows Dasein itself as such:
Im Verstehen liegt existenzial die Seinart des Daseins als 
Sein-können. Dasein ist nicht ein Vorhandenes, das als 
Zugabe noch besitzt, etwas zu können, sondern es ist primär 
Möglichsein (…) Die Möglichkeit als Existenzial dagegen 
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ist die ursprünglichste und letzte positive ontologische Bes-
timmheit des Daseins (…) Den phänomenalen Boden, sie 
überhaupt zu sehen, bietet das Verstehen als erschließendes 
Sein-können (Heidegger, 1984: 143-144).
However, this understanding (Verstehen) which opens 
Dasein towards itself and towards the entity, does not refer 
to a static capture nor an information topic stored, on the 
contrary, it has a projective character. In other words, in 
it, Dasein opens determined and historical ways of the 
being of the entities and of itself which are patented in the 
significance of their world: (…) das Verstehen an ihm selbst 
die existenziale Struktur hat, die wir den Entwurf nennen. Es 
entwirft das Sein des Daseins auf sein Worumwillen ebenso 
ursprünglich wie auf die Bedutsamkeit als die Weltlichkeit 
seiner jeweiligen Welt (Heidegger, 1984: 145). In that case, 
in Dasein’s everyday being mode, in which it is interpreted 
not from itself in a proper manner, but in an improper 
way from its world (Heidegger, 1993:169), such essential 
moments in language are far from their real and true vo-
cation. The expression becomes gossip (Gerade). The word 
becomes repetition of common places and in an everyday 
conversation, far from its fundamental (Heidgger, 1993: 
190-193). Certainly, the entity is lied to, but it is not 
released in its being, rather it is repressed in the vagueness 
of its sense; interpretation, for its part, appeals to mere 
conventionalisms in which the symbols do not orient to 
a profound mystery, to a full sense, but to pre-established 
codes; and comprehension –starting and decisive moment 
of language- does not listen directly to the entity but to 
what is said about it. Heidegger never loses sight of the 
mode in which language is given with the moment of 
being eminent in Dasein, whichever dominates it during 
their whole existence. Jar Aler expresses about this: “But 
the mode of the ek-sistence in which Heidegger’s exposition 
reveals the constitutive character of language is, within the 
general perspective of the preparatory analytic, the average 
everydayness: language is an instrument to be used in social 
intercourse” (Cockelmans, 1972: 50).
This phenomenon is factually possible through the 
insertion of the human being in a culture which is pre-
viously determined by “common” (Navia, M.2010: 129) 
but this is nothing more than a phenomenon ontologi-
cally determined by One (das Man) and everydayness 
(Alltäglichkeit) as the way of temporization fall of Dasein 
(Heidegger, 1993:151). In turn, the definitive cause of 
the fall of language in everydayness is the detachment of 
hearing of being-able-to-be more of Dasein and of the 
entities spoken of, returning to comprehension of being 
a median and exclusive comprehension (durchsnittlich) of 
what is spoken as such.
Gemäß der durchschnittlichen Vertständlichkeit, die in der 
beim Sichaussprechen gesprochenen Srache schon liegt, 
kann die mitgeteilte Rede weitgehend everstanden werden, 
ohne daß sich der Hörende in ein ursprünglich verstehendes 
Sein zum Worüber der Rede bringt. Man versteht nicht so 
sehr das beredete Seiende, sondern man hört schon nur 
auf das Gerredete als solches. Dieses wird verstanden, das 
Worürber nur ungefähr, obehin; man meint dasselbe, weil 
man das Gesagte gemeinsam in derselben Durchsnittlichkeit 
versteht (Heidegger, 1984:168).
From the degradation of speech as an ontological 
condition of language, the general interpretation of the 
entity is converted into manipulative cultural product and 
in tradition and patrimony of society. As all entities to be 
understood are not presented, but rather ambiguously 
interpreted, from the has-been (Vorhabe), in a previous 
way of seeing (Vorsicht), and a previous conceptualiza-
tion (Vorgriff) that does not come from a full opening of 
Dasein (Heidegger, 1993: 174).
Language is mineralized in the native tongue, where 
traditional grammar represents the unconscious tool of 
control and domain. Its power is yet even more efficient, 
as the native tongue becomes the interpretation of an 
unconditional world, and where it confuses itself with 
what is real regarding real. In other words, language passed 
down from previous generations, introjects an interpreta-
tion of the world that is highly overwhelming and effec-
tive, that we view the world as given by these generations 
(Ortega and Gasset, 1970: 146). However, this previous 
generational interpretation is in turn determined by a 
historical-ontological decision regarding being.
The human being is involved and entangled in a 
whirlwind (Wirbel) due to the invisible halo –however, 
because of it, implacable- of the discursive sphere of the 
language which we belong to. Knowledge of the previous 
generation, very well praised by Durkheim, highly con-
tributes to its domain. Nevertheless, it is our condition of 
freedom which leaves us paradoxically surrendered to it, 
as our deepest being-toward-death ricochets us toward the 
protection of pre-established world disclosure (Bergung), 
leaving us in a being-in-the-world in the improper mode 
of the dominating claim. Such fall and surrender are due 
to the fact that on a daily basis we express ourselves in a 
repetitive and uprooting way; we conventionally interpret 
through a predetermined language and we also publically 
understand the entity (Öffenlichkeit). Jan Aler describes 
the fall of language as logoV in the following way: 
Logos taken in this oral form of fallness is mere banter, small 
talk. It is in this manner that, in the changing determination 
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of the relation between logos and language, the mode of 
Being of man decides the ontological character of language 
(…) if one approaches a structure in its everydayness, the 
everydayness determines its concretization. The disquali-
fication of the moment of wording cannot remedy this; 
the structure of logos is merely made ambiguous by this 
disqualification (Cockelmans, 1972: 56).
Because of the preeminent phenomenon of everyday-
ness and the fall, Dasein generally moves in an interpreta-
tion of the entity fixing its conclusions in previous intend 
(Vorhabe) not directly guided in a listening and confron-
tation of the entity itself; but in a “cultural tradition”, in 
a previous point of view (Vorsicht) predetermined by the 
tendencies of that time, and a previous conceptualization 
(Vorgriff), where ideas about what has been said about 
things in the world controls it. All true epochal things 
(predominating social unveiling of the entity) will be 
predetermined by this previous interpretative condition 
of the language. What is decisive here is not the direct 
question of the being of the entity, but the acceptance of 
what has been previously said about it. This acceptance 
determines with anticipation the appropriation of the 
understanding (Heidegger, 1993:174).
It is this fall of original understanding that determines 
the full degeneration of the fundamentals (letting-be, tem-
porality, truth, world disclosure) which allow all speech. 
Likewise, this degeneration drags down the fundamentals 
of the essence of language itself. In effect, manifesting 
the entity (aπofansiV) -real vocation of language – is 
betrayed, due to the fact that transcendence is not given as 
letting-be  to the entity; temporality, instead of temporizing 
a future for Dasein, is dominated by the anachronism of 
past has-been; being-in-truth as an apophantic revelation 
of the entity, is only given as an ambiguity and occul-
ting; and instead of reaching a proper view of the world 
(Haltungweltanschauung)  it degenerates (Entartung)  as a 
business (Betrieb), adaptation, and convenient agreement 
and shelter (Bergung) (Heidegger, 1999: pp.381-386). 
These ontological conditions are the ones which have 
allowed in the modern domain of world public interpreta-
tion, manifested in language and reinforced by techniques 
such as control and violence towards the entity, to apply its 
domain and power (Aussage), as the only place for truth. 
Regarding these factual conditions about this ontological 
and epistemological twist of the modification of truth 
manifested in technical terms, Blanco Ilari expresses:
This abandonment (of basic certainties of everydayness. 
N.A.) marks a distance, more pronounced over time, bet-
ween the language of those who still speak doxa and the one 
used by those who have reached the height of the episteme 
(…) the strange thing about “truth” is crystallized in the 
discursive creation of idiolects who are more and more 
exclusive. The “reality” hidden in appearances, is expressed 
in a special language, hyper-technified, whose code can only 
be managed by those who have dared to get rid of natural 
language (Blanco Ilari, Juan.2015:28).
The statement represents the exclusive form, formalized 
and uniform to interpret the entity, characterized by the 
predicative determination of a feature of the being of the 
subject, which is abstracted over all other things, but the 
richness of the totality of the meanings from where these 
interpretative predicates are taken from, is not taken into 
consideration (Heidegger, 1993:180-181). 
Interpretation, understood as a reference of the entity 
to the structures of “in terms of” loses with the statement 
the rich world of references to which the what of the entity 
is sent. Even this loss experienced by the interpretation is 
the essence of the statement itself:
Die Als-Struktur der Auslegung hat eine Modifikation er-
fahren. Das “Als” greift in seiner Funktion der Zueignung des 
Verstandenen nicht mehr aus in eine Bewandtnisganzheit. 
Es ist bezüglich seiner Möglichkeiten der Artikulation von 
Verweisungs bezügen von der Beduetsamkeit, als welche die 
Umweltlichkeit konstituiert, abgeschnitte. Das “Als” wird 
in die gliechmäßige Ebene des nur Vorhandenen zurüc-
kgedräangt. Es sinkt herab zur Struktur des bestimmenden 
Nur-sehen-lassens von Vorhandenem. Diese Nivellierung 
des ursprünglichen “Als” der umsichtigen Auslegung zum 
Als der Vorhandenheitsbestimmung ist der Vorzug der 
Aussage. So gewinnt sie die Möglichkeit puren hinsehenden 
Aufweisens (Heidegger,1984:158).
Thus, the entity is “detached from the world” (Entwelt-
lichung): “every time that sense is further from the origin, 
it wins and loses something at the same time: it becomes 
more and more explicit (this represents a win), but it loses 
its mundane condition, meaning, it loses the wealth of the 
multiple relations of sense which enclose practical life.” (Ber-
torello, 2008:128). The theory of judgment, based on the 
statement, becomes the modern idol through which only 
and exclusively the entity must appear in. This must be 
understood only in this way in terms of objectivity. The 
entity is reduced to Object. This expression, in this case, 
means the apophantic way in which the entity must 
exclusively appear. In this ontic condition, the human 
being is dragged and deprived of its most proper world. 
This phenomenon belongs to everydayness essence itself. 
However, it reaches its peak in modern times. Juan Blanco 
Ilari expresses about this:
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The subject who migrates is an uninterested subject. Its 
function is to make all things objects of knowledge; that is 
to say, to establish “uninterested observation” as a relational 
pattern. The epistemic imperative of abandoning the subject 
embodied, in the realm of doxa, to devote the epistemic sub-
ject (universal and necessary) is born with philosophy and is 
radicalized in modern times” (Blanco Ilari, Juan, 2015: 27).
Moving on with the analysis, we can pose that in this 
dimension, modern mathematical logic and grammatical 
syntax, in fact, even the comprehension of philosophy in 
solely apophantic terms as we have posed, exert the con-
trol of how it should manifest in its truth. Truth, which 
efficiently serves the experimental application of science 
and modern technology. Accordingly, when language 
becomes a mere tool and technique, loses its original vo-
cation, meaning it no longer manifests the being, it only 
names and in-forms about the entities. In his conference 
given on April 2nd, 1936 named Holderlin and the Essence 
of Poetry (Hölderlin und das Wesen der Dichtung) Martin 
Heidegger criticizes this modern comprehension of lan-
guage as a mere instrument: 
Die Sprache ist nicht nur ein Werkzeug, das der Mensch 
neben vielen anderen auch besitzt, sondern die Sprache 
gewährt, uberhaupt erst die Möglichkeit, inmitten der Off-
enheit von Seiendem zu stehen. Nur woSprache, da ist Welt 
(...)Die Sprache ist ein Gut in einem ursprünglicheren Sinne 
(…) sie leistet Gewähr , daß der Mensch als geschichtlicher 
sein kann.Die Sprache ist nicht ein verfügbares Werkzeug, 
sondern dasjenige Ereignis, das über die höchste Möglichkeit 
des Menschseins verfügt (Heidegger, 1981: 37-38).
Indeed, from this perspective, from the analysis of the 
degeneration of the ontological fundamental of langua-
ge, the historical morphosyntactic analysis of modern 
Indian-European languages, where the loss of participles 
and future infinitives, the predominance of the indicative 
verbal mode and the loss of the indicative verbal tenses 
(antepreterito) and subjunctive (future imperfect) are 
understood in first instance. Meaning, they are not over-
looked as a series of “curious” and isolated tendencies, 
object of linguistics as science, but rather it is recognized 
in the depth of all of these, the decisive influence of 
modern world interpretation, which views in the factual-
objectual the only mode of unhiding and manifestation 
of the entity’s being.
Nonetheless, is this the only way an entity can manifest 
itself? What if we discovered that listening for being-with 
as a longing, as a mode of being proper of Dasein, we 
could unveil a much deeper and real way of manifesting 
the entity instead of just in the mere abstraction of the 
entity as a statement? And from this perspective, What 
form of language could offer us the proper perspective for 
a deeper understanding of the entity? We need this deepe-
ning because, in effect, what is revealed in the statement 
is the insufficiency of a fixed and empty temporality, a 
monosemic, and a pre-established interpretation exclusi-
vely objectual of the world. Only this explains the success 
with which logic has been applied and controlled in the 
state or modern science. Nonetheless, in the depth of the 
being-with listening as a longing, a truth of the entity is 
hidden in such a transcendent way, that it escapes any 
attempt of manipulation coming from the factual world.
Let us observe, as follows, how everyday language 
can retake its pristine genesis and fundamental vocation 
through the phenomenon of Poiesis and the reflection 
surrounding listening: as we have said, it is only possible 
through through the internal memory of the beginning 
(Heidegger, 2006: 50). In them, the transcendence, the 
revelation of the being, temporality and world disclosure 
should be openly manifested in order that the question 
of the being can be open in a factual Dasein
From degeneration of language  
in everydayness to its fullness  
in poetic language 
All language refers to a manifestation of the being of 
the entity. When this is accomplished, its more original 
vocation, the saying is foremost a poetic one, since naming 
things in their essence it pro-duces them, takes them to the 
being creative. Thus, poetic language is the original lan-
guage (Ursprache). It is from this dimension, from which 
all language originates and, hence, from which all language 
comprehension attempt acquires its full meaning:
Dichtung ist nicht nur ein begleitender Schmuck des 
Daseins, nicht nur eine zeitweitlige Begeisterung oder gar 
nur eine Erhitzung und Unterhaltung. Dichtung ist der 
tragende Grund der Geschichte und deshalb auch nicht 
nur eine Erscheinung der Kultur und erst recht nicht der 
blöße “Ausdruck” einer “Kulturseele” (…) Dichtung ist das 
stiefende Nennen des Seins und des Wesens alles Dinge- kein 
beliebiges Sagen, wodurch erst all das ins Offene tritt, was 
wir dann in der Alltagssprachen bereden und verhandeln. 
Daher nimmt die Dichtung niemals die Sprache als an 
vorhandenen Wekstoff auf, sondern die Dichtung selbst 
ermöglich erts die Sprache.Dichtung is die Ursprache eines 
geschichtlichen Volkes. Also muß umgekehrt das Wesen der 
Sprache aus dem Wesen der Dichtung verstanden werden 
(Heidegger, 1981:42-43).
How language manifests itself from everydayness, we 
have previously posed that this degenerates and its dege-
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neration is patented in its three constituent moments, 
namely, in ambiguous and unfounded speaking, in the 
conventional grammatical meaning and public interpre-
tation. This fall of language, as we have said, does not 
come from itself, but from the metaphysical fundamentals 
which make it possible. The fall is, overall, the one of 
Dasein in its being-in-the-world (Heidegger, 1993: 198). 
However, the possibility that it retakes and recompiles its 
fundamental being, meaning, the one in which the ques-
tion for the being becomes determining for its historical-
factual being-in-the-world. This possibility refers to the 
listening of the being when it allows being called upon 
itself by the call of fundamentals. This listening implies a 
theoretical-contemplative attitude, a free being-with (sein-
lassen) (Heidegger, 1996: 112) which fully opens Dasein 
to the being of the entities in an interrogative attitude. It 
is only this listening understood as being-with, the me-
taphysical fundamental of language, thus, what makes it 
possible “The true experience of language is not in saying, 
but in listening (…) The real experience of language lies in 
listening to the words of the being’s silence (…) in listening, 
man is a patient and only in this way does one have a pro-
found experience of language.” (Navia, W. 2010: 140-141)8. 
Thus, when placing itself in this essential ontological 
and foundational dimension, the human being rescues 
language and brings it to its essence: it comprehends, 
significantly interprets and says the being of the entities, 
hence, it recreates, transfigures and poetically names them. 
In effect, theoretical attitude itself (Qewria), understood 
originally as contemplation and fundamental protoaction, 
it is referring to a longing-listening of what fundaments 
and makes possible language as such.
If human beings stop for one moment their everyday-
ness, among these the continuing need for gossip, and 
direct themselves to direct attentive listening of things, 
only then will it be possible for these to manifest with 
their own light (fainoV). This can only precisely happen 
because the essence of language is not something ontic 
as Plato thought, nor is it a product of speculation of the 
human mind, as proposed by empiricism and modern 
epistemology, but the enlightening (Lichtung) of the 
being from which all entities become clear:
One crucial point for Heidegger is that the clearing cannot 
be identified with any of the entities which showed up in it. 
It is not be explained by them as something they cause, or 
one of their properties, or as grounded in them (…) So the 
clearing is Dasein-related yet not Dasein-controlled. It is not 
Dasein’s doing. (…) Heidegger’s position can be seen from 
one point of view as utterly different from both Platonism 
and subjectivism because it avoids onticizing altogether; 
from another point of view, it can be seen as passing between 
them to a third position which neither can imagine, one 
which is Dasein-related, but not Dasein-centered (Dreyfus 
& Wrathall, 2005: 44-45). 
This is the essence of language, its poetic dimension, 
from which the human being transcends the conceptual 
schematics of its time and from which all language un-
derstood as social use and all grammar, it is fed as a crea-
ting source that flows its waters surreptitiously. “Human 
language responds to an instinct of poeticizing, as a creating 
production, which affirms facing the animal world, and at 
the same time the philosopher, artist, in other words, Poet, 
in the original sense of Poiesis. It opens new courses of action 
when liberating it from the yoke of logic.” (Visbal, Marta de 
la Vega, 2010: 214). The word becomes fusiV because it 
opens the being; logoV because it reunites in the essential, 
in what founds and gives meaning; and aπeiron, because 
instead of retaining, solidifying and marking limits (de-
fining) to the entity in a determined essence (language-
lexic-grammar) it releases it in change of limitations, it 
frees it and takes it to the presence, and it also presents it 
in completely new forms and possibilities of being.
Being-with -understood as protoaction founded in 
the care of freedom9-, in which listening is called upon 
by the being, contributes and brings to light the funda-
mental of the entities, which initiates them and makes 
possible all encounters; live, real and updating presence 
of things, where all anachronisms of One is overcome by 
the encounter with what is always new; the revelation of 
its essence, not as substances but as phenomena always 
willing to hide-unhide; and the comprehensive attitude, 
not as a passive adaptation of the world received, but as a 
creative and pro-ductive attitude in constant transfigura-
tion and reconfiguration. The being occurs in the world 
throughout the word:
Language
You, sign of the enjoyment
sound of the suffering
Candor of his tenderness;
Tear of the silence,
Fist juncture of the closest proximity
Return freely
To your crown
And dance the pain of the Being
In the home of the world
Whose light is consumed 
While illuminating
All that comes from it
M.Heidegger 
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The fullness of the metaphysical fundamentals of 
language carried out by the appellation-contemplative 
of the being, in which the question about the being as 
eminent dimension of the being-in-the-world of a factual 
Dasein has been released, it transforms language itself in 
its essential moments. It has been passed through the re-
solution (Erschlossenheit) and a destruction of apophantic 
to hermeneutic logos:
La destruction de la logique, toujours dejà uniment phéno-
ménologico-hérmeneutique, s’applique à l’ipse aliéné par das 
Man, parlé par la lingua aliena du On commandé par un 
concept traditionnel de la vérité propositionnelle qui réfère, 
en dernière instance, à un temps nivelé,axè sur l’être intér-
preté- vécu- comme Anwesenheit (Sommer,C, 2014: 134).
Meaning that in this dimension of strangeness 
(atoπoV) awe-contemplating  (qaumazein) and per-
plexity (diaπorhsanteV) in which  the dictatorship of 
everydayness is broken and Aristotle himself had long ago, 
catalogued in his book Metaphysics as the fundamental 
principle of all knowledge, (Aristotle, Metaphysics: 76) 
understanding takes deep from the being itself, no longer 
in a mediated way, it is no longer based in the has-been, 
but in the could-be which is projected by the entities 
from the presence and revelation of their own essence; 
the interpretation-meaning is not limitedly supported on 
a convention of symbols, but it points out (semhuein) 
through its own means, intimate and metaphorical, and, 
hence, polisemic; and the expression releases the entity 
in its being and presents it from what it dictates, not the 
public interpretation of reality, rather the saying offered 
and is revealed in all listening and contemplative human 
silence of the entity.
Being human
Who knows silence in which the world retracts? 
Who dares inhabit where bliss slips by?
Who calls sudden their year?
To whom does the favorable occurrence lean?
Who corresponds the poem?11
In that case, if the poetic dimension of language, -res-
cuing from listening language itself from its technical and 
instrumental conception- opens Dasein and places it in 
the full opening of the question for the being, meaning, 
this is found in an understanding of being transcendent. 
This transcendence or understanding of the being, has 
three fundamental ontological features: logoV, fusiV, 
aπeiron, fundamental problems of the first Greek phi-
losophers. Hence, to take the liberation of the question 
of the being to its fullest it will be necessary to listen with 
devotion the saying  of Western thought12, assuming once 
again a meditation, an interiorizing memory  of these es-
sential moments of the being from a new perspective and 
at once linked in a unique and hermeneutic way to the 
classic tradition understood as occurred history that up to 
now determines us without us even knowing (Heidegger, 
2006: 44-52). From this reopening and return (nostoV) 
of the question for the being, the fundamentals which 
make the humble and daily miracle of language possible 
are patented, not as a “thing” or “tool”, but as one of the 
fundamental ontological features of the human being. 
However, further research of this nature highly exceeds 
the limits of this work.
Final reflections 
The understanding of the relation between language 
and metaphysics in Heidegger must be done from the 
horizon of life and complete work of the great German 
master. Likewise, as a master, Heidegger must be inter-
preted taking into account two fundamental sides: 1. 
The public field where he birthed his work, meaning, his 
published work, like Sein und Zeit, and his conferences, 
which are characterized by exposing general guidelines; 
2. The letters with his friends and in particular with 
Hannah Arendt, who represents a bridge between the 
depth where the master retracted himself in his lone-
liness and retirement in Todnauberg and in the paths 
towards the meadows. 3. The personal and solitary level 
of Heidegger as master, researcher and philosopher: let us 
say an achromatic Heidegger, from where all his deepest 
teachings and thoughts are deployed. His famous lessons 
and black notebooks (Schwarz Hefte) belong to this side, 
and the stenography of his disciples. This implies that all 
methods for the understanding of a problematic between 
language and ontology in Heidegger should always take 
into account this fundamental feature of his life and work. 
The public thought of Heidegger should be focused on 
the size and depth of his intimate work as master, friend 
and lover. This final side is much deeper and of a higher 
transcendence in philosophical terms, if we take into 
account that most of Gesamtausgabe has not yet been 
translated into Spanish13. 
This is why regarding the access way to the problem, we 
have used a synthetic hermeneutic about the fundamental 
existential not only posed in Sein und Zeit, but also in this 
deeper level of his lessons. In that case, this method would 
be useless if not understood, besides, these existentials as 
themselves, meaning, in interaction, coaction and move-
ment. Aspect, in which Jan Aler, as it mentioned before, 
we considered a loyal follower. Without losing sight of 
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these methodological guidelines as an access form to the 
problematic of the origin of language in metaphysics, let 
us try to answer in a clear way the questions which guided 
this research:
Which are the metaphysical fundamentals of language 
and how are they articulated with one another? First of 
all, the understanding of Dasein, which is only possible 
through listening (Hören), but since listening itself means 
being-on-hold (Heidegger) and a form of care (Sorge), 
then this means that listening itself as being-on-hold is 
time: in the form of a memory and also as an anticipated 
projection of the presence, of a parousia (πarousia). 
Time in the mode of the resolution, as commemora-
tive and projective temporality of the presentation of the 
entities, releases the human being in an enraptured way 
in the transcendent encounter with the being, and it 
poetizes it, it fills it with the endlessness of the being, and 
only in this way the entities can reach the word: through 
overabundance.  The problem with our understanding 
of everyday language is that it refers to an emission, 
expression, symbols, codes and grammar, while what we 
are presenting with Heidegger is that language is above 
all listening, silence, being-on-hold for the encounter of 
the being, the moment when the deep question for this 
arises. And referring to metaphor of don Miguel Una-
muno, just as from the tree we cannot see the roots, but 
we do see its foliage, like from language what we perceive 
every day are the factual and sensorial expressions in it. 
Anachronistic language used in a more formal everyday 
routine, including in many occasions degraded scientific 
language, like the one from a deep spring, which nurtures 
itself silently and mysteriously from that constant renewal 
in this metaphysical fundamental of comprehension, 
which without, when completely separating, it petrifies 
and empties itself. In such a way, language reaches speak-
ing not by shortage but by overabundance. The human 
being sheds as he is impregnated with the being and it 
only belongs to it. In doing so, simultaneously, it creates a 
world, reconfigures world disclosure in which it has been 
born and trapped in and renews it historically, that is to 
say, it makes the freedom of the being happen (Ereignis) 
in it, and also this happening is one of truth, a revelation 
(a-lhqeia), parousia (πarousia), this is, presence 
from the rupture of everydayness: thus, authentic and 
resolved temporality makes the being-on-hold possible, 
and at once, this makes listening possible, listening to 
understanding, understanding to interpretation and this 
one to the expression of language. The expression takes the 
being to the world, but for this to occur, there must always 
be a rupture from everydayness, in other words, liberation 
and return (ana-lusisV) from and regarding the mode 
of the temporality fallen from Dasein. But methodologi-
cally speaking, the resolution of authentic temporality is 
given at the same time that the historical occurrence of 
truth in a world disclosure, free and independent of all 
generational dictatorship. In this sense, temporality-world 
disclosure-truth-historicity cannot be understood linearly 
according to a simplifying law of cause-effect, how Dasein 
usually interprets its world, but from a dynamic articula-
tion, cofounding and original, just as Heidegger proposes 
in the initial methodological guidelines of Sein und Zeit.
Regeneration of language and its return to its full sense 
from the objectivity of predicative formalism and from 
the ambiguity of factual everydayness does not imply a 
distancing of the entities, but contrary to this, the rege-
neration and the re-rooting of the human being from a 
transcendent sense, but in turn, inmanent and complete. 
“The authentic ex-sistence does not hover above everydayness 
but is a special mode of rooting therein”(Cockelmans, 
1972: 59)14. 
We believe that the practical repercussions of these 
considerations about metaphysical origins of language 
are numerous. Nevertheless, we believe that two of them 
outstand in an essential way. 1. Only understood language 
in its essence as silence is one which allows the intimate 
encounter of two human beings, it is the loving root, in 
any of its forms of love in which it is manifested. This 
allows the continuity of all human communities without 
being a society and it would degrade in a grotesque horde. 
2. Since the deepest vocation of language is no to in-form 
the entity15, in other words, fill it of superflux meaning that 
has nothing to do with its essence, but on the other hand, 
ex-press and free the being of all entities, then it un-reifies 
it, it de-mineralizes it of all labels that anachronize and 
degenerate in mechanical repetition of the generational 
transmission. This opens the fullness of world disclosure to 
the dimension of beauty, what gives strength, the unfatho-
mable and the infinite, which Plato describes in his sixth 
book of his Politeia, this is agaqoV just as a-mecaneton, 
opens human beings towards what they cannot and never 
will be able to manipulate because it comes from it and 
elevates and is beyond all entities: eπekeina thV ousiaV 
πresbeia kai dunamei uπerecontoV (Burnet, 1903: 
509 b) However, the path laid out and proposed for us by 
Heidegger is very broad, endless and dense. Despite ha-
ving gone through diverse aspects regarding metaphysical 
principles that fundament language, this problem is not 
fully depleted. Instead, new unavoidable questions arise 
which we have not been able to approach, for example, 
the relation between a community of determined people 
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by dialogue and how these metaphysical principles of 
language would factually be delivered among them. The 
importance of a doxastic community, for a dialogue to 
exist, has been posed by Blanco Ilari: 
In the field of human affairs, it is necessary to be part of the 
polis and to be nourished and conformed by its uses and 
customs to be able to take part in discussions (…) dialogue 
is impossible without this requirement of pre-sociability, 
because basic beliefs which sustain it are not present. It is 
not about a mere postulate, but rather an elemental pheno-
menological fact; without a linking element there can be no 
possible dialogue (Blanco Ilari, Juan, 2015: 29).
On the other hand, regarding pending goals, we believe 
that for a full understanding of the problem of language 
from a phenomenological perspective of Heidegger’s 
work, an interpretation plenior is necessary, meaning, going 
beyond the great German philosopher’s interpretations, 
because his life was not enough to elucidate in the depth 
of a complete landscape, a more articulate and global 
understanding of his fundamental aspects can be offe-
red, where pressing aspects such as world disclosure and 
language, time and language, truth and language, among 
others can be contemplated and related. And above all how 
he himself in one part of Die Frage nach dem Ding, posed 
and applied in hermeneutics regarding Kant: to be able to 
understand his work mainly in what the author does not 
express, but leaves reluctant. Thus, we consider that it is 
not mandatory to restrict to an orthodox interpretation 
of Heidegger’s work, but to go beyond and reconfigure 
from our own contributions. However, this implies a very 
challenging work, because much of his work is yet to be 
addressed, translated and published even in its original 
language. As is well known, Heidegger’s complete work 
(Gesamtausgebe) is quite broad and requires a delicate use 
and knowledge of German, as well as Greek and Latin. We 
should not conform ourselves with Spanish translations, 
but rather realize a careful and complex hermeneutic 
work, and proceed to the original sources whenever pos-
sible17. Hence, it is also necessary, to avoid distorting the 
methodological horizon of Heidegger’s language, to carry 
out a deep revision of modern philosophers such as Kant 
and Hegel; medieval philosophers such as Saint Agustin, 
Saint Thomas, William of Ockham and Eckhardt,   intam 
oftinance of a doxasticaosis on the fate of a broken dialo-
gueGreek philosophers, Heraclitus, Parmenides and Plato 
(specially the problem of a-lhqeia), and in particular 
Aristotle, who Heidegger criticizes about the domain 
of the apophantic statement but takes his fundamental 
achievements to analyze factual life from where language 
comes. We emphasize in the path remaining regarding 
the problem of world disclosure, an aspect which is cu-
rrently slightly addressed by the critic and heideggerian 
exegetes, a topic which we also consider essential in the 
understanding of how language reaches speech and from 
what perspective and criteria18. 
Another –perhaps the most important- problem, 
which needs elucidation, is the relation between lan-
guage with temporality, a fundamental understanding 
horizon of Dasein for all structures of it as explained in 
Sein un Zeit (Cockelmans, 1972: 45,) and also with the 
affective disposition or humor (Befindlichkeit) present in 
all understanding. For this, we would like to continue 
Jan Aler’s pioneering research. The relation between the 
authentic Dasein and literature, as a full mode of language 
is another topic we consider unavoidable because of the 
ethic connotations it implies to the human being. Aspects 
we will attempt to address in further research.
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Notas
1 These reflections about language, product of the lessons of 
the lecture Introduction to Philosophy 2012-2014, became 
part of chapter V of a greater research called The liberation 
of the Question for the Being, presented as an extraordinary 
promotion work for Associate and were carried out with the 
sponsorship of  Centro de Investigaciones Contexto y Praxis 
Socioeducativa (CIPSE) affiliated to Instituto Luis Beltrán 
Prieto Figueroa of Universidad Pedagógica Experimental 
Libertador.
2 Ph. D. Associated Professor part of Instituto Luis Beltrán 
Prieto Figueroa de la Universidad Pedagógica Experimental 
Libertador. Barquisimeto, Venezuela. Affiliated to Centro de 
Investigación Contexto y Praxis Socioeducativa (CICPSE). 
ojbarragan@gmail.com. Area code 3001.
3 Jan Aler (1910-1992) dutch, was an eminent professor of 
aesthetic and philosophy of culture in the University of 
Amsterdam. He studied in Freiburg from 1938, very closely 
to M. Heidegger from who he was influenced. The work we 
use here is his essay Heidegger’s Conception of Language 
in Being and Time published as the second chapter of the 
first part of the compilated and translated work by Joseph 
Cockelmans in 1972, On Heidegger and Language.
4 We use the word metaphysics in a rigorous sense as those 
deductive principles that decisively link all entities with and 
from what essences it. Throughout this research, we alternate 
this word with the expression ontology. Cf. Grondin, J. 
Introducción a la Metafísica. Prologue. p. 17.
5 Regarding public opinion of the spring of 1968, Heidegger 
writes terrified and pessimistic to Hanna Arendt: “Is there 
still an “alternative” to that which is so sinister called “public 
opinion”, better said: Is there a measurement for essential things 
before that chatter of “alternatives”? Why on earth must the 
human being pass until it realizes that it does not make itself? 
Messkirch. April 12, 1968. Mail. Herder. Barcelona. 2000. 
pp. 158
6 In April 1964, Heidegger writes to Hanna Arendt: “after 
conversations we have had in the paths around Zähringen, 
you know how this question decisively (the essence of lan-
guage) occupies the center of my thoughts, which without, 
meditation between thought and poetry would be without 
any land.” Arendt, H. Heidegger, M. 2000: 134)
7 However, we do not completely agree with Blanco Ilari, 
his claim that this imperative is born with philosophy 
itself, we believe that the form of speech in Anaximandro, 
Parmenides and Empedocles, to quote some of the first 
philosopher thinkers, is far from apophatic and closer, 
even in some cases identifies itself as poetic. To clarify this 
problematic, to an extent, we would have to deepen in the 
problem which meant episteme for Greeks, for example 
in Plato, for whom it was not implied as claimed before, a 
radical distancing of everyday entities. Cf. books V and VI 
of his Politeia, The Sophist or The Banquet, for example. 
But the topic is considerably challenging to present it here. 
We tend to conceive the problem of distancing, not only 
from a historical-factual perspective but also and existential 
ontology whose roots would be the problem of temporality 
(Zeitlichkeit) and everydayness (Alltäglichkeit) in the form 
posed by Heidegger in Being and Time. Nevertheless, we 
think that his criticism to Rhetoric as a form of distancing 
is very interesting. Cf. Blanco Ilari, Juan. p.28.
8 The fact that for Heidegger silence (Stille) and listening 
(Hören) was just about a mere objective and thematic con-
cern was demonstrated in the incredible source of resources 
of the  language in the letters, during more than 50 years, 
to his beloved Hanna Arendt, which would require many 
other works. Here is an example of one: “My dear love, 
your silence in response to my story of my activity –we 
are both people who have trouble speaking- but who also 
understand silence.” M. Heidegger to Hanna Arendt, when 
she was his young student in Marburg, May 13, 1925. Mail. 
P.31.HerderBarcelona.2000. Twenty-five years later, in the 
reencounter stage, he claims: “Hanna: listening frees. That 
you obeyed the voice dissolves everything in the in good and 
gives the new security of retractatio.” Friburg, February 15 
1950. Even at the end of the 60s, Heidegger’s suggestions, 
concerning the topic of language about silence, is shown by 
Hanna Arendt’s reply in November 1967: “Dear Martin. 
Thank you for your letters, thank you for the “examples” 
80 × Universidad de San Buenaventura, Cali - Colombia
Oscar Barragán Abreu
of the transitive use of silence (it is pretty, and I believe I 
understood it instantly(…)” New York. November 27 a 
1967. Ibid. p. 154
9 In his superb lesson in the winter of 1929 Einleitung in 
die Philosophie, Heidegger expresses “This ‘being-with/
do’  is only possible in the cure or care (…) and, however, 
that being-with, that Sein-lassen, is a doing if the highest 
and most original kind which can be conceived and is only 
possible on the basis of the intimate essence of our existence, 
namely, freedom.” (Heidegger, 1996: 112)
10 Arendt, Hannah, Heidegger.Martin.Mail. Ed.Herder.
Barcelona.2000.p.103.
11 Ibid.pg.81
12 Regarding these Indian-European roots of the word ‘say’ 
and its relation with truth, Ortega and Gasset express: “Re-
garding the inner Latin voice and ours –from here verbum, 
word- but not any saying, but the most solemn and serious 
to say, a religious saying in which we place God as witness 
to our saying, overall, an oath.” (Ortega and Gasset,1970: 
139-140)
13 From his cabin in Todnauberg, full of Kierkegaard, 
Holderlin’s readings and The Magic Mountain of Thomas 
Mann, Heidegger writes to Hanna Arendt in the fall of 
1925: Fall has come here with its cold nights and wonder-
fully sunny days. I have submerged myself with a great deal 
of energy in my work, and I can tackle things without the 
proper obstacles of the profession (…) I have forgotten the 
aspect of the “world,” and I will feel like a mountain dweller 
coming down to the city for the first time. But in this solitu-
de, capable of producing unimaginable forces, human things 
also seem simpler and stronger and lose their most dismal 
element- everydayness. We must move over and over to the 
point where everything is new as if it were the first day- and 
this is generated by the productive work of isolation. Often, 
when I am overloaded, I rush to the nearest mountain and 
let the storm roar in my ears. I need the proximity to nature; 
and when, situation which occurs frequently, I contemplate 
at two in the morning, finishing my work, the calm of the 
valley from above and feel the starry sky near it- I am then 
only activity and life.
 (Heidegger, 2000:46). Not even his beloved escaped from 
this necessary retreat which is also the most essential encou-
nter and listening. A few months later, in winter, he writes 
again: I have forgotten you –not because of indifference nor 
because certain external circumstances have intruded, but 
because I had to forget you and I will forget you every time 
I take the path of the last and concentrated work. It is no 
such thing of hours or days, but a process which separates 
for weeks and months and later on it sends. And getting 
away from all that is human and all relationships is, in 
terms of creation, the greatest thing I know among human 
experiences (…) Your heart is ripped out of your body while 
you are completely aware (Heidegger, 2000: 51).
14 A beautiful and patent example of it lies in a piece of art, 
which is in the spine of our Spanish literature, hidden in 
the deep and ontological essence of Quijote, where Alonso 
Quijana, who sees his surroundings sad and worn, when he 
comes to that madness that Plato praises in Fedro, takes away 
their patina, and to understand them projectively in a full 
and elevated sense. Young Rimbaud’s proposal to take down 
all the senses to penetrate in intuitive poetry also acquires 
from a particular reading in Heideggerian hermeneutic code, 
some very meaningful connotations. Regarding the impor-
tance of literature in Heidegger’s thought and the opening of 
Dasein, Jan Aler expresses something very beautiful: “What 
literature is able to accomplish is what Heidegger is concer-
ned with: literature discloses ek-sistence; it communicates 
possibilites of moodness. It brings man to the there of his 
Being-there.” (Cockelmans, 1972: 61)
15 This should be applied and repeated, more and more on 
a global scale, for all knowledge-including the most acute 
researchers- the term information, is not just mere coinci-
dence, trend or whim, but the symptom of trivialization of 
language itself and its current superficialization.
16 In 2014, it caused a world-wide commotion, the publishing 
of the famous, but not very well known in the public eye, 
Schwarzen Hefte, from the period of the Third Reich.
17 To understand how the philosopher portrayed himself as very 
cautious and apprehensive about the misinterpretation in 
other languages of his work, in particular in Latin America, 
refer to the letters to Anna Arendt. In one of them Hanna 
Arendt advises: “In Latin American countries, they translate 
without asking anything presented to them.”21/04/1954. 
Mail.Hannah Arendt-Martin Heidegger. Herder, Barcelo-
na.2000.Barcelona.2nd  ed.
18 For an update on new research about M. Heidegger, we 
refer to the excellent Bulletin heideggérien from the Centres 
d’Études phénoménologique de l’Université catholique du 
Louvain and the Centre d’herméneutique phénomenologi-
que de l’Université Paris-Sorbonne, founded at the beginning 
of 2010 by Sylvain Camilleri and Christophe Perrin. This 
publication is offered to the public and updated every 1st 
of March in various languages including, among others, 
German, French, Spanish, Italian, English, Japanese, Arabic, 
and Mandarin. 
